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CHAPTER 22 
Administration of Justice 
ALAN J. DIMOND 
A. THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
§22.1. Business of the Court.1 Between September I, 1959, and 
August 31, 1960, the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court decided 
303 cases. For the preceding year the number was 292, and for the 
years next preceding the numbers were 268, 254, and 248. During the 
1960 SURVEY year the Court also rendered two advisory opinions. 
Even though the vacancy created by the death of the Associate Justice 
James J. Ronan in December, 1959, was not filled during the year, 
the Court, by extraordinary exertion, nevertheless decided before the 
end of July, 1960, all cases argued or submitted before the summer re-
cess. Thirty-one of these cases were disposed of by rescripts without 
opinions. . 
Of the 303 full bench cases, 269 (89 percent) were briefed and argued 
by both sides, 17 (51 percent) were briefed and argued by only one side, 
the other side submitting on its brief or not appearing, and 17 (5i per-
cent) were submitted on brief by one or both sides but not argued by 
either. The decision of the trial court was affirmed in 192 cases 
(63 percent), affirmed with modification in 12 cases (4 percent), and 
reversed in 81 cases (27 percent). Eighteen cases (6 percent) came up 
on report without decision. 
The average time between the entry of a full bench case in the 
Supreme Judicial Court and the consultation of the Justices was 120 
days, from consultation to decision 57 days, or a total time of 177 days 
between entry and decision. For the preceding year the corresponding 
intervals were 123 days and 63 days, or a total of 186 days. 
§22.2. Petitions to be heard by a single Justice instead of the full 
bench. Upon the recommendation of Executive Secretary John A. 
Daly,! legislation during the 1960 SURVEY year transferred from the 
ALAN J. DIMOND is a partner in the firm of Bernkopf. Goodman. Houghton and 
Dimond. Boston. He is secretary of the Massachusetts Bar Association. an associate 
editor of the Massachusetts Law Quarterly. and the author of The Superior Court of 
Massachusetts: Its Origin and Development (1960). 
§22.1. 1 Statistics used in this chapter have been obtained from the offices of 
John A. Daly. Esquire. Executive Secretary to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial 
Court. Chief Justice Paul C. Reardon of the Superior Court. and Hon. Kenneth L. 
Nash. Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the District Courts. 
§22.2. 1 Third Annual Report to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court by 
the Executive Secretary. Pub. Doc. No. 166. p. 19 (1959). 
1
Dimond: Chapter 22: Administration of Justice
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1960
240 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §22.3 
full bench to a single Justice the hearing of petitions for late entry 
of appeals, bills of exceptions and reports, petitions for leave to appeal 
late, and petitions to establish the truth of exceptions.2 All such pe-
titions are henceforth to be filed with the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Suffolk County. . 
§22.3. Notice of ripeness of case for preparation of record for the 
full bench. From 1931 to 1959, the party on review having the obli-
gation to cause the necessary papers to be prepared was required, 
within ten days after the case became "ripe" for final preparation and 
printing of the record, to give a written order for the preparation of 
the necessary papers for the full bench. Since no notice of ripeness 
was required to be sent by the trial court,l determination of this fact 
was the responsibility of the party charged with giving the order. 
A late order was an incurable jurisdictional error unless a case came 
within the strict limits of an "accident or mistake or other sufficient 
cause" of a petition for late entry.2 Yet an erroneous determination of 
ripeness could always be avoided by giving the order promptly after de-
ciding to seek review even though the case had not yet become ripe.s 
To eliminate a possible trap for those who failed to give season-
able orders, legislation in 1959 provided that the order did not have 
to be given until ten days after the party seeking review "had been 
notified by the clerk, recorder, register or other official that the case 
had become ripe." 4 This amendment did not, however, place an ex-
plicit duty on the clerk and the others to give the required notice. 
Nor did the amendment state that the notice had to be in writ-
ing or how it was to be sent. 
These omissions were corrected by a further amendment in 1960.11 
Henceforth when a case becomes ripe, the clerk or other official must 
forthwith give to the party seeking review a notice to that effect by 
registered mail, return receipt requested. Within ten days after re-
ceiving such notice, the party seeking review must then give his 
written order for preparation of the necessary papers. Nothing in 
the amendment, it should be observed, changes the general rule that 
failure to give the order within the prescribed time is fatal to the 
review. Nor does t~e amendment prevent a party from following the 
former safe practice of giving the order even before the case has be-
come ripe. 
2 Acts of 1960, c. 207. 
§22.1I. 1 Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Sweeney, 1109 Mass. 26, 29, 1111 N.E.2d 575, 
578 (1941). 
2 G.L., c. 211, §11. See Royal Tool Be Gauge Corp. v. Clerk of Courts for the 
County of Hampden, 326 Mass. 390, 393, 94 N.E.2d 781, 782 (1950); St. Nicholas 
Russian Benefit Society, Inc. v. Yaselko, 279 Mass. 81,84,180 N.E. 721, 723 (1932). 
8 Loranger v. Martha's Vineyard Regional High School District School Committee, 
338 Mass. 450,452, 155 N.E.2d 786, 793 (1959). . 
4 Acts of 1959, c. 109. 
II Acts of 1960, c. 171. 
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B. THE SUPERIOR COURT 
§22.4. Business of the court. Denied the services of District Court 
judges in both motor tort and misdemeanor cases, because of the re-
fusal of the legislature to provide funds to compensate District Court 
judges for their Superior Court sittings during the 1960 SURVEY year, 
and with a vacancy in the Superior Court remaining unfilled from De-
cember, 1959, through the end of the 1960 SURVEY year, the Superior 
Court was unable to maintain its recent pattern of annual reduction 
of its inherited backlog. The following table tells the story. Only 
vigorous work by the Court, aided by auditors and the Transfer Act, 
prevented a serious lapse. 
TABLE I 
Superior Court Business 
1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 
Undisposed of cases be-
ginning of year 68,739 61,681 56,974 51,774 
Entries during year 35,619 39,030 36,883 39,233 
Dispositions during year 42,209 43,660 42,455 36,774 
Undisposed of cases end 
of year 59,673 56,972 51,783 53,844 
Undisposed of law cases 
end of year 52,356 49,185 43,765 45,554 
Remaining triable law 
docket end of year 40,473 36,267 30,294 35,975 
The interval between entry and trial of jury cases in the regular 
course maintained stability in most counties near the one-year mark. 
The loss in Berkshire County was again due to a large number of 
land damage cases, all of which are entitled to a speedy trial. The fol-
lowing table tells the story for all counties. For the 1960 SURVEY 
year, original and removed cases are not separated, since the repeal 
of the Fielding Act (requiring all motor tort cases to be started in a 
District Court) on September I, 1958, has made the separation sta-
tistically unimportant. 
§22.5. The Transfer Act. Upon the recommendation of Execu-
tive Secretary John A. Daly,1 certain provisions of the Transfer Act2 
§22.5. 1 Third Annual Report to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court by 
the Executive Secretary, Pub. Doc. No. 166, p. 24 (1959). 
2 G.L., c. 231, §102C, inserted by Acts of 1958, c. 369, §§3, 4, authorizing the 
Superior Court, "after determination that if the plaintiff prevails, there is no rea-
sonable likelihood that recovery will exceed one thousand dollars," to transfer, or 
remand as it is commonly called, any tort or contract action to an appropriate Dis-
trict Court for trial by a full-time justice. After a District Court trial, remanded 
cases, upon application of an aggrieved party, are subject to retransfer to the Su-
perior Court, where the District Court finding is given prima facie weight. 
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TABLE II 
Number of Months Interval Between 
Entry and Trial of Civil Jury Cases 
July 1, 1957 July 1, 1958 July 1,1959 July 1,1960 
Barnstable 
Original 24 20 29 10 Removed 20 9 10 
Berkshire 
Original 29 9 21 28 Removed 30 9 21 
Bristol 
Taunton 
Original 20 8 9 11 Removed 20 10 11 
New Bedford 
Original 21 18 11 14 Removed 20 18 II 
Fall River 
Original 24 12 12 10 Removed 21} 12 7 
Essex 
Salem 
Original 15 12 14 12-1 Removed 17 9 14 
Lawrence 
Original 18 12 15 17 Removed 20 12 16 
Newburyport 
Original 6 6 9 9 Removed 6 6 9 
Franklin 
Original 7 8 8 12 Removed 9 4 13 
Hampden 
Original 16 9 II 12 Removed 13} 9 11 
Hampshire 
Original 10 10 11 10 Removed 10 6 7 
Middlesex 
Cambridge 
Original 31 23 16 15 Removed 26 11 12 
Lowell 
Original 24 16 14 12 Removed 26 7 12 
--- -------- --------------------
4
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July 1, 1957 July 1, 1958 July 1,1959 July 1,1960 
Norfolk 
Original 15 12 13 13 Removed 19 12 14 
Plymouth 
Plymouth 
Original 7 11 12 13 Removed 9i 10 11 
Brockton 
Original 10 10 12 13 Removed 11 11 11 
Suffolk 
Original 30 12 12 12 Removed 15 12 11 
Worcester 
Worcester 
Original 11 9 10 13 Removed 13 11 11 
Fitchburg 
Original 28 12 19 11 Removed 29i 12 22 
were clarified by Chapter 303 of the Acts of 1960. Doubt had arisen 
whether interrogatories, specifications, and other interlocutory mat-
ters could be dealt with in a District Court or whether a District Court 
was restricted to the trial of a case in the condition received from the 
Superior Court. To resolve this doubt, the 1960 amendment made 
a remanded case subject to all District Court procedures and, to avoid a 
like doubt upon a retransfer, also provided that upon retransfer of a 
remanded case to the Superior Court, all papers filed in the District 
Court after remand are to be transmitted to the Superior Court. A 
further change made by the 1960 amendment allows a District Court 
to dismiss an action if both parties fail to appear for trial before it. 
The legislature declined or thought it unnecessary to adopt a recom-
mendation of Mr. Daly that questions of law in remanded cases be 
made subject to regular District Court Appellate Division review.!1 Sub-
sequently the Supreme Judicial Court decided that questions of law are 
already subject to such review without need of specific enabling legis la-
tion.4 
The results of the Transfer Act are reflected in the table on the 
following page. This table reveals the large number of dispositions 
without trial. 
3 Third Annual Report to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court by the 
Executive Secretary, Pub. Doc. No. 166, p. 25 (1959); Fourth Annual Report, Pub. 
Doc. No. 166, pp. 10, II (1960). 
4 Lubell v. First National Stores, Inc., 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 351. The Court also 
stated that decisions of the Appellate Division are not, however, subject to appeal 
under G.L., c. 231, §109. 
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TABLE III 
Transfer Act Cases 
District Courts (Other than Boston 
Boston Municipal Court) Municipal Court 
1958·59 1959-60 1958-59 1959-60 
Remanded from 
Superior Court 3,788 3,646 1,342 3.089 
Tried in District 
Courts 816 1,073 365 650 
Retransferred to 
Superior Court 266 475 95 255 
Pending in District 
Courts 1,315 1,393 655 1,628 
§22.6. Right to speedy trial in medical malpractice cases. Gen-
eral Laws, c. 231, §59C, requiring a speedy trial of a medical malprac-
tice case only upon the defendant's motion, was extended by Acts of 
1960, c. 69, to require a speedy trial in such a case upon the plaintiff's 
motion as well. 
§22.7. Contract jury session in Suffolk County. In a successful ex-
periment to dispose promptly of commercial controversies, a special 
contract jury session in Suffolk County was established by the Chief 
Justice of the Superior Court and sat for 74 days between February 
and June, 1960. Of the 79 cases assigned to the session, 30 were tried 
to a verdict, 40 were settled, 5 were continued and 4 were disposed of by 
nonsuit or default. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURTS 
§22.8. District Court business. The business of the District 
Courts, other than the Boston Municipal Court, is shown in the fol-
lowing table. 
TABLE IV 
District Court Business 
(Other than Boston Municipal Court) 
1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959·60 
Civil writs entered 75,993 79,817 73,988 74,066 
Removals to the 
Superior Court 14,409 16,100 7,020 4,447 
Criminal cases begun 223,760 236,519 242,208 263,683 
Small claims 68,546 68,281 68,192 72,091 
Juveniles under 17 9,204 10,235 9,153 9,378 
Parking tickets 
returned 817,488 865,912 798,983 910,414 
§22.9. Six-member juries. Six-member juries sit in the Central 
District Court of Worcester to hear cases upon the consent of the 
6
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parties. During the 1960 SURVEY year, 28 such cases were tried to a 
verdict. An additional 137 cases were settled. 
§22.10. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Ex-
perience with the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Act is shown in 
the following table. 
TABLE V 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act Cases in District Courts 
(Other than Boston Municipal Court) 
1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 
Number of cases 
initiated 977 1,070 1,167 
Number of cases re-
ceived from other 
states 396 456 539 
Amount collected $822,163 $1,018,258 $1,198,473 
§22.11. Small claims. Small claims limits were raised from $75 to 
$100 by Chapter 160 of the Acts of 1960. 
§22.12. Partial removals to the Superior Court. Prior to 1956, 
partial removals of cases from a District Court to the Superior Court 
were generally limited to contract actions in which there were multiple 
claims for manual labor or in which the defendants were severally 
liable upon a written contract. Legislation in 1956 eliminated these 
restrictions so that all tort and contract actions could be removed as 
to any party and retained in a District Court as to others_ l Com-
plexities flowing from the freer rule made it advisable to reimpose 
limitations. This was done in 1960, upon the recommendation of 
the Judicial Council,2 by restoration of the basic pre-1956 rule re-
stricting partial removals to the specified contract actions.s 
The 1960 act also provided that removal of a case shall lift a Dis-
trict Court default. It seems that plaintiffs had previously claimed 
that even though a removal was seasonable, a default entered before 
removal (the time for appearing and answering in the District Courts 
being shorter than the time for removal) nevertheless prevented a de-
fendant from filing an answer in the Superior Court until the default 
had been lifted. 
D. OTHER MATTERS 
§22.13. Uniform Arbitration Act. Until 1925, Massachusetts 
agreements to arbitrate future controversies were governed by the com-
§22.l2. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 302, §1, amending G.L., c. 231, §104. 
2 Thirty-Fifth Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144, p. 56 (1959). 
S Acts of 1960, c. 352. 
7
Dimond: Chapter 22: Administration of Justice
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1960
246 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §22.l4 
mon law. When such agreements went to the "root of the action," 
they were held to be unenforceable unless careful draftsmanship made 
submission to arbitration a condition precedent to resort to the courts 
for a remedy.1 In 1925, following the enactment of similar federal, 
New York, and New Jersey statutes, Massachusetts adopted a statute 
validating contracts to submit future controversies to arbitration.2 
Recent experience with the increasingly important arbitration proc-
ess has suggested the desirability of modernizing the Massachusetts 
statute. Because of the unique features of collective bargaining agree-
ments to arbitrate, ¥assachusetts legislation, in 1959, based on the 
Uniform Arbitration Act, provided specially for such arbitrations.3 
Retaining the 1959 act, Chapter 251 of the Acts of 1960 then adopted 
the Uniform Arbitration Act for all other types of controversies under 
agreements entered into after December 31,1960. 
The 1960 statute not only supersedes the 1925 statute in respect of 
arbitration of future controversies but also replaces statutes dating 
back to 1786 for arbitration of existing controversies. It establishes 
a simple motion procedure to enforce, confirm, vacate, or modify an 
award; it deals with notice of hearings, conduct of hearings, repre-
sentation by counsel, issuance of subpoenas, taking of depositions, 
confirmation and vacation of awards; and it also provides for an appeal 
from judicial orders, judgments, and decrees entered pursuant to its 
authority. "Such appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same 
extent as from orders or judgments in an action." 4 Does this mean 
an action at law? If so, the scope of review would be limited to orders 
"decisive of the case founded upon matter of law apparent on the 
record." 5 Or does the provision for an appeal contemplate an appeal 
as in equity, which can bring up the entire case for review? Use of 
the Uniform Act's undefined term "action" leaves the answers to these 
questions uncertain.6 
§22.14. Counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases. Until 
June, 1958, the principal provisions of general application concerning 
court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants were G.L., c. 277, §47, 
and Superior Court Rule 95.1 The effect of these provisions is to 
require assignment of counsel for a defendant charged with first degree 
murder who is unable to procure counsel. The Superior Court rule 
§22.13. 1 Lakube v. Cohen, 304 Mass. 156, 158,23 N.E.2d 144. 145 (1939); Brockle-
hurst and Potter Co. v. Marsch, 225 Mass. 3, 9, 113 N.E. 646. 649 (1916). 
2 Acts of 1925, c. 294, §5, explained in Spence, Bryson, Inc. v. China Products Co., 
308 Mass. 81, 88, 30 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1941). See Grinnell, The New Commercial 
Arbitration Act, 10 Mass. L.Q. No.3, p. 21 (1925). 
3 Acts of 1959. c. 552. adding new Chapter 150C to the General Laws. See 1959 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.17. 
4 Acts of 1959. c. 552. §18. 
5 G.L.. c. 231. §96. Lapan v. Childs. 330 Mass. 451. 453. 115 N.E.2d 146. 147 (1953); 
Harrington v. Anderson. 316 Mass. 187. 191.55 N.E.2d 30. 33 (1944). 
6 See Vieira v. Menino. 322 Mass. 165. 168.76 N.E.2d 177. 179 (1947). 
§22.14. 1 See also G.L .• c. 277. §47. noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §23.2. 
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allows payment of compensation to assigned counsel of not more than 
$1000 in such a case. Prior to June, 1958, assigned counsel was pro-
vided in cases not within the coverage of the statute and rule only 
where, because of special circumstances, due process required such 
assignment.2 Counsel so appointed, however, received no public com-
pensation for their services. 
In June, 1958, the Supreme Judicial Court, without reference to 
special circumstances, adopted General Rule 10, requiring counsel to 
be assigned in all noncapital Superior Court felony cases unless the 
defendant "elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain coun-
sel." 3 No provision was made or could be made by the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court to compensate lawyers so appointed; and the legislature 
did not supplement the rule by making any funds available. In Suf-
folk County, however, and in a few other busy places some of the 
burden of providing and compensating counsel was assumed by a 
charitable corporation, Voluntary Defenders, Inc., which for many 
years had been engaged in this work. But in June, 1960, this organiza-
tion was forced to suspend operations for lack of funds. Because of 
the Massachusetts constitutional prohibition against using public 
funds for a privately owned charity, state support could not be fur-
nished to it.4 
Recognizing the general responsibility of government to provide 
counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases, the legislature, by 
Chapter 565 of the Acts of 1960, created the Massachusetts Defenders 
Committee, an unpaid group of eleven persons to be appointed by the 
Judicial Council. Except for staggered terms of eight of the original 
eleven members, all terms shall be for four years. The committee is di-
rected to provide counsel in noncapital criminal cases "in any court 
of the commonwealth provided the laws of the commonwealth or rules 
of the supreme judicial court require that the defendant in such pro-
ceeding be represented by counsel, and provided, further, that such 
defendant is unable to obtain counsel by reason of his inability to 
pay." Provision is made for an executive secretary and a professional 
and clerical staff. Funds may be accepted from private as well as 
public sources. 
The applicable rule of the Supreme Judicial court, already men-
tioned, requires assignment of counsel only in noncapital felony cases 
in the Superior Court. Although the high court's rule recognizes the 
inherent power of District Courts also to appoint counsel, there is no 
mandate in the rule to that effect. 
The members of the Massachusetts Defenders Committee have al-
ready been appointed and funds have been appropriated for it by the 
legislature. 
2 Brown v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 476, 140 N.E.2d 461 (1957); Pugliese v. 
Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 471, 140 N.E.2d 476 (1957); Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 
Mass. 558, 87 N.E.2d 142 (1949). 
3337 Mass. 813 (1958). 
4 Mass. Const., Amend. Art. XLVI. 
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